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BRITISH CORPORATE LAW REFORM
CORPORATE law, which regulates the heart of a nation's economy, has
recently been subjected in Great Britain to a detailed re-evaluation by the
Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment. I Established to ex-
plore the deficiencies that eighteen years of experience have demonstrated
in the Companies Act of 1929, 2 the Cohen Committee a has made recom-
mendations touching virtually every field of corporate regulation. 4 Though
sponsored in legislative form by the Labor Party, the Report, initiated under
the wartime Conservative Party, contains no reference to the socialized seg-
ment of the British economy and is without suggestion of a doctrinal attack
on the limited liability system.
The Companies Act of 1929 substantially combines in its scope the func-
tions performed by our state corporation laws and by the federal acts admin-
istered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Unlike the federal en-
actments, however, it affects all aspects of virtually all corporate businesses;
and unlike the far from uniform state laws, it provides a unified statute which
parallels our federal laws in the extent of regulation.
The basic problem confronting the Committee arises from the redistribu-
tion of power and wealth resulting from a broadened base of corporate owner-
ship. In England as in the United States widely dispersed small sharehold-
ings have replaced the entrepreneurial stock participation of earlier years. r
The disproportionate power thus vested in a management divorced from
ownership makes imperative the most enlightened supervision and regula-
tion.
1. Cmd. 6659 (hereinafter cited as REPoRT). The Report consists of a series of tersely
discussed amendments which stress, as problems to which public attention has particularly
been drawn, prospectuses, nominee shareholdings, accounting, and "control." Excluded
from the scope of the amendments are questions of general economic policy and special
war time legislation. REPoRT §§ 1, 3, 7.
2. 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23. For a concise description of the history of the Companies
Acts see Horrwitz, Historical Development of Company Law, 62 L. Q. REV. 375 (1946).
3. The Committee of thirteen experts was chairmanned by M1r. Justice Cohen of
the King's Bench Division of the Supreme Court of Judicature and is popularly referred
to as the Cohen Committee. Appointed in 1943, the Committee held 47 meetings hefore
submitting its Report in June, 1945. REPoRT § 4.
4. The proposed amendments, substantially incorporated into a Companies Bill, have
been passed by the House of Lords and by the House of Commons as this Comment went to
press. See 441 H. C. D. 172 (5th Ser. 1947).
5. "This tendency is growing at the present time, and the number of shareholders is
likely to increase further, with a corresponding diminution in the size of the average
shareholding." REPoRT § 124. The statistics of ten typical companies presented in the Re-
port show an average of 41% of the stockholders each holding less than 100 shares, 67%
less than 200 shares, and 88% less than 500 shares. Ibid. See generally, Grn,:.Dy, Sur -x"
OF SHAREHOLDINGS IN 1,710 CoPORATIOxS WITH SECURITIES LIsTEn o A , ATIOMAL Sn-
CUMITIES EXCHANGE (TNEC Monograph 30, 1941) ; BE AND ME.A-.s, Tnn &Morsax
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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The Report has'followed traditional lines in that disclosure of adequate
information is the chief technique proposed to facilitate supervision by ag-
gressive stockholders as well as by the government. In addition, the disclo-
sure provisions are designed to increase the rational element in investments
and to dispel the secrecy which might sap public confidence in the limited
liability system. With equal emphasis, higher standards of fiduciary conduct
are defined for directors and more stringent means of enforcement recom-
mended. 6
In order to compare the legislative techniques suggested by the Report
with analogous American statutes the more important of the proposed
amendments have been grouped below under the generic classifications of
general corporate organization, supervision of stock, the position of directors,
and stockholders' control. 7
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION
The Committee expressed satisfaction with the conscientious management
of the vast majority of limited companies and predicated the welfare of the
national economy as a whole upon its continuation. Corporate organization
was therefore left fundamentally unchanged, and suggested reforms directed
mainly towards classification of obligations within existing institutional re-
lationships.
Ultra Vires. The Committee's initial recommendation is a frontal attack
on ultra vires. The doctrine has proved an unnecessary pitfall for creditors
of a corporation, who, unless the corporation has charter powers for the
activity involved, may have no legal rights of recovery. 8 Conversely, the
existing practice of drafting charters to include any foreseeable business 0
may make illusory the doctrine's protection to stockholders.
6. The Committee would also afford a division of labor between legislative regula-
tion of the Companies Act and administrative control through the London Stock Ex-
change Council and the Board of Trade. The Stock Exchange Council is a non-govern-
mental body similar to the New York Stock Exchange Committee, while the Board of
Trade is the governmental department of commerce.
7. The relatively minor recommendations on mortgages and charges (REPORT §§ 61-
71) and on liquidations (REPORT §§ 142-53) are not discussed. Also omitted are the sec-
tions on the particularly British classification of "private" companies (REPORT §§ 47-60).
A private company is defined by § 26 of the Companies Act as one which (a) restricts the
transfer of its shares; (b) limits its shareholders to fifty; and (c) prohibits any solicita-
tion to the public for shares or debentures of the Company.
8. "For example, if a company which has not taken powers to carry on a taxi-cab
service, nevertheless does so, third persons who have sold the taxi-cabs to the company
... may have no legal right to recover payment from the company .... (A)s now ap-
plied lo companies, the ultra vires doctrine serves no positive purpose but is, on the other
hand, a cause of unnecessary prolixity and vexation." REPORT § 12.
9. See Cotman v. Brougham, [1918] A.C. 514, esp. the opinion of Lord Wrenbury at
521; SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, AcTivrinzs, PFasoN-
1384 [Vol. 56: 1383
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To abolish the doctrine it is proposed that "every company ... should
.. have as regards third parties the same powers as an individual," 10 a for-
mula followed only in the most advanced American statutes. In the future
charters are to be solely stockholder-corporation contracts concerning the
powers of directors. With such reform charter amendment is rendered pos-
sible by special resolution only. "
Trade. Names. The Report proposes to eliminate litigation over deceptively
similar corporate trade names by giving an administrative body discretion
to approve all names. This discretionary power, to be vested in the registrar
of companies, would be appealable exclusively to the Board of Trade. 12
The constitutionality of a similar provision has recently been upheld in Il-
linois against the attack of unlawful delegation of power without adequate
legislative standards. 13
NEL AND FuqcTioxs OF PRoTrCVE AND REORGANIZATION Co-sTirra.S, pt. VII, 479
(1938).
10. REPORT § 12. The proposal appears substantially that of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings, MODE Busnmss Co.ro.Vzon
Acr §§ 10, 11. A minority of states have similarly undertaken statutory modification of
the doctrine. CA.. Civ. CODE §345 (Deering, 1941); ID.ao LAws An.nz. §29-114 (1943);
ILT_ STAT. AN. c. 32, §157.8 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946); Ina. STAT. AN:. §25-202
(Burns, 1933); KAN-. GEN,. STAT. § 17-3001 (Corrick, Supp. 1945); LA. Gin;. STAT.
§ 1092 (Dart, 1939); MicH. STAT. ANN. §21.11 (1938); MIN.I. STAT. §§ 7492-10, 11
(Mason, Supp. 1940) ; MoT. REv. CODES § 5994 (1935) as amended by Laws 1947, c. 39;
Nan REV. STAT. § 21-1, 117 (1943) ; Oaio GF.. CODE § 8623-8 (Page, 1938) ; PA. STAT.,
tit. 15, § 2852-303 (Purdon, 1938); VT. Pun. LAws § 5817 (1933); WVAsrr. REV. STAT.
§ 3803-11 (Remington, Supp. 1940). Kansas had already approached its reform by judicial
construction. Harris v. Independence Gas Co., 76 Kan. 750,92 Pac. 1123 (1907).
For reluctance to desert precedent and use the new freedom see MacQueen v. The
Dollar Saving Bank Co., 133 Ohio St. 579, 15 N.E.2d 529 (1938) (Ohio modification dis-
cussed but decision based on another ground) ; Unione Fratellanza Oratinese v. Picciano,
129 Ohio St. 466, 196 N.E. 155 (1935) (doctrine held still available as a defense "under
proper circumstances"). The English proposal does not appear to retain the doctrine as
against a third person having actual knowledge of the lack of corporate authority. Cf.
however, Ernest v. Nicholls, 6 H. L. Cas. 401 (1857). See generally Horrwitz, Company
Law Reform and the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 62 L. Q. REv. 66 (1946).
11. The Report has been criticized for not abolishing the dichotomy of memoranda
and articles. "There is no reason why ... the whole of a company's constitution should
not be embodied in one document instead of two." Kahn-Freund, Company Law Reform,
9 MoD. L. REv. 235, 236-7 (1946). Ex-tension of the principle to public corporations is
also questioned. Id. at 237-8.
12. The power of rejection vested in the two administrative bodies would be exercised
at registration and before any business unlike practice under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. Discretion would extend to rejection of names which may mislead the public by un-
warranted inclusion of the words "bank" or "trust." REmrrt §§ 15-6. Our states typically
have a statutory listing of such words. See, for example, N.Y. PtNAL LAw §§ 663, 666;
N.J. STAT. AwN. § 14: 2-3.
13. ILL. STAT. Aim. c. 32, § 157.148 (Smith-Hurd, Supp, 1946), Investors Syndicate
of America, Inc. v. Hughes, 378 I11. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754 (1941). The statute specifically
provides for appeals from the ruling of the Secretary of State to the courts; cf. N. Y.
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Parent-Subsidiaries. The existing definitions of subsidiaries in the Com-
panies Act suffer from over-emphasis upon direct stock ownership and do not
reach sub-subsidiaries. 14 The Report, following the lead of our federal enact-
ments, proposes control as decisive of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
Since a legislative standard is desirable, the Committee defines control as
the power to procure the election or removal of a majority of directors of a
company either through ownership of any part of the share capital in that
company or in any other company, or by any other means as long as some
share capital is beneficially owned. Even in the absence of voting control,
however, beneficial ownership of over half of the equity share capital would
furnish an alternative definition. 15 The "election" test undoubtedly falls
within the dual definition of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (10%
control of voting stock or "controlling influence") 1 and thus sacrifices some
breadth for a presumably more tangible criterion.
For parents and subsidiaries, consolidated balance sheets and profit and
loss statements would be required, 17 and many fine accounting distinctions
GEN. CORP. LAW § 9. Where statutes prohibit misleading or confusing names, judgment
by an administrative body in certifying a certificate of incorporation is not conclusive on
the courts. Standard Oil Co. of New Mexico v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973
(C.C.A. 10th 1932). Indeed, a certificate by a state corporation clerk has been given "no
weight." Eureka Fire Hose Co. v. Eureka Rubber Mfg. Co., 69 N.J.Eq. 159, 60 Atl. 561
(Ch. 1905), aff'd inem. 71 N.J.Eq. 300, 71 Atl. 1134 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
14. § 127 of the Companies Act defines a subsidiary as a company in which a second
company either owns more than 50% of the issued share capital or voting stock or has
the power directly or indirectly to appoint a majority of directors, Apparently the indi-
rect power of appointment has not been considered to reach sub-subsidiaries. See REPowr
§ 116; 89 SOL. J. 583-4 (1945) ; Kahn-Freund, supra note 11, at 238-9. The present defi-
nition is also too broad in some circumstances. Ownership of all of a company's prefer-
ence capital, if greater than the voting capital, would now make the second company a sub-
sidiary even if not controlled in any way. REPORT § 118.
15. RE ORT pp. 72-3. Although the alternative definition in terms of half ownership
of the equity does not fully meet the objection of note 14, supra, the Committee found that
such a concentrated -holding might give practical control of the business even without vot-
ing control. REPORT § 118.
Power arising only from provisions of a debenture trust deed or by virtue of shares
issued for such purpose are excluded as in the 1929 Act. REPORT p. 72. COMrANICS Ac'
§ 127(1) (b). One of the few places in the Report in which American experiences are di-
rectly cited is § 118, where the Committee mentions our recognition of control as definitive
of the parent-subsidiary relation for accounting purposes.
16. § 2(a) (7) and (8), 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79a (1940) (hereinafter
cited by section number only). See H. M. Byllesby & Co., 6 S.E.C. 639 (1940), 51 YALE
L. 3. 1018 (1942). See also § 2(a) (9) of the Investment Companies Act, 54 Stat. 789
(1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1940) (hereinafter cited by section number only) (controlling
influence with rebuttable presumption of control arising from beneficial ownership of 25
of the voting securities). § 2(a) (11) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act has the
additional classification of an "affiliate" (one definition in terms of 5% ownership of voting
securities). See § 2(3) of the Investment Companies Act.
17. To the extent that complete consolidation would be misleading, directors are given
discretion to adjust the accounts or annex supplemental information, REPORT §§ 119-20
[Vol. 56 :13831386
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removed by the required elimination of inter-group stock ovnership and
indebtedness. I Subsidiaries would also be prohibited from purchasing fur-
ther shares or voting present stock in their parent companies. 19
Accounts. The necessity for the modernization of accounting require-
ments, a basic objective of the study, has been recognized by emphasis on
greater break-down and intelligibility of individual items. Special attention
is paid to reserves which-with calculated financial modesty-have been
hidden through a variety of accounting techniques which include the crea-
tion of excessive provisions for contingencies, the charge of capital expendi-
ture to revenue, and the use of profits for an excessive write-down of invcst-
ments, property or machinery. _ 0The attention thus paid to the exposure
of undisclosed reserves strikes partially at the advantages given to directors
in personal dealings in company stock. In addition, conservatism of this
type on the balance sheet is equivalent to a non-conservative income state-
ment, since the resultant understatement of depreciation charges and the
like will in the future overstate profits. 21
A legislative differentiation between fixed and current assets is proposed m
which has potential importance in standardizing these items for ratio analy-
ses. However, only to this extent has uniformity of accounting practice been
and pp. 73-4. Contrary to the proviso in § 126 of the present Act, it will be necessary to
specify the amounts of the profits and losses of any subsidiary in the holding company's
account Ibid. See Murphy, Revision of British Company Late, 30 Mnx.. L. RE,. 525,
597-9 (1946). Cf. SEC REGULATIO-N S-X, Art. 4.
1& REPORT pp. 73-4.
19. § 45 of the Companies Act would be extended to prohibit a subsidiary from pro-
viding money for subscription of its own shares or those of its holding company and to
prohibit the subsidiary from buying or providing financial assistance for the purchase of
shares of the holding company. An exception is made when shares are hld as trustee for
others and the present exception in favor of employees continued. RErowr § 170 and pp.
107-8.
20. "We do not believe that, if fully informed, shareholders would press for excessive
dividends.... It is also important... to dissipate any suggestion that hidden profits
are being accumulated by industrial concerns to the detriment of consumers and those who
work for industry." REPORT § 101. Compare the opinion of Mr. Justice Buckley in New-
ton v. Birmingham Small Arms Co., Ltd., [1906] 2 Ch. 378, 387 "The purpose of the bal-
ance sheet is primarily to show that the financial position of the company is at least as
good as there stated, not to show that it is not or may not be better." See also Stapley V.
Read Brothers, [1929] 2 Ch. 1; discussion of Rex v. Kylsant, 23 Crim. App. R. 83 (1931),
in Maclntyre, Criminal Prozisions of the Securities Act and Analogies to Sirnilar Critni-
mal Statutes, 43 YALE L. J. 254 (1933) and in 172 L. T. 139, 161 (1931).
21. See generally Kripke, A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting,
57 HAIv. L. Ra. 433 (1944); Kripke, Accountants' Financial Statements and Fact-Find-
ing in the Law of Corporate Regulation, 50 YALE L. J. 1180 (1941). Assurance and In-
surance Companies and such trading and discount companies as the Board of Trade may
designate are absolved from showing separately reserves and provisions for depreciation.
REPoRT § 101.
22. Fixed assets are defined as assets not held for sale or conversion into cash; cur-
rent assets as cash and assets held for conversion into cash. ronr § 100 and p. 5S. Corn-
1947] 1387
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imposed; corporations will continue to be able to adapt accounts to the di-
verse requirements of their business. 23 The Report also reiterates the rec-
ognized objection to the declaration of dividends to the extent of paid-in
surplus. 24
Accompanying the emphasis on accounting is an attempted specification
of auditor standards which was noticeably lacking in the 1929 Act. The
Board of Trade is to be given power to certify eligible auditors, and employ-
ees, directors, or associates may not render such service to their own com-
pany. 25 With the auditors' more dominant functions go a description of
minimal duties 26 and increased powers of inspection and access to meet-
ings. 21
Inspections. The Report would achieve supervision of the revised company
pliance of public utilities companies with this provision is not obligatory. REPORT p. 59. Cf.
SEC REGULATION, S-X, Rule 3-13 (current assets are those generally realizable within
one year).
23. REPORT § 97. The Committee, discussing accounting requirements, notes that it is
where companies are reluctant to make public information that statutory standards are
most needed by accountants. See 12 SEC ANN. REP. 118 (1947) "unless accountants can
point to legal requirements as to the extent of disclosure they are often unable to insist
on a position contrary to that of the management." A recommendation that accountants be
supported by the SEC accounting regulations was made in the Commission's report to
Congress, PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD INVESTORS IN UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, H. R Doc.
No. 672, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1946).
For recommendations to the Committee by the Institute of Chartered Accountants,
see 116 THE ACCOUNTANT 108 (1947) ; 89 SOL. J. 559, 572 (1945).
24. Share premiums would henceforth be governed by the sections of the Companies
Act relating to the reduction of share capital. REPORT § 108. For American state statutes,
see Comment, 49 YALE L. J. 492, 499 n. 24, 25 (1940). Cf. § 12(c) of the Public Utility
Holding Compapy Act.
There is no reason to suspect that the English dividend rule of Verner v. General and
Commercial Investment Trust, [1894] 2 Ch. 239, is changed. See Katz, Accounting Prob-
lerns it; Corporate Distributions 89 U. PA. L. REV. 764 (1941).
25. REPORT § 110. See SEC GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER TIHE SECUII-
TIES AcT OF 1933, Rule 650, 17 CODE FED. REGs. § 230.650 (1938) ; In the Matter of Red
Bank Oil Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1933 Release No. 3110, Jan. 4, 1946.
26. The auditors' report is at the minimum to state (a) whether proper books of ac-
count have been kept; (b) whether all the information necessary for purposes of the audit
has been obtained; (c) whether the accounts are in agreement with the books, and "ex-
hibit a true and fair view of (1) the state of affairs of the company as of the date of the
balance sheet and (2) the profit and loss . . . for the period ended on that date;" and (d),
in the case of a holding company which has not annexed consolidated accounts, whether
the reasons given for not consolidating are satisfactory. REPORT p. 68. See, on the stand-
ards of auditors, SAMUEL, SHAREHOLDERS' MONEY 315-25 (1933) ; Rabel, Anditing Staud-
ards and Procedures in the Light of Court Decisions, 42 Micn. L. REV. 1009 (1944).
27. § 134 of the Companies Act is criticized for weakening the auditors' report since
certification may now be made "as shown by the books of the company." It is recom-
mended that each auditor have a right of access to all information and be entitled to re-
quire explanations from company executives necessary to the performance of his duty.
REPORT p. 68.
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law by an increased authorization of governmental inspections. One weak-
ness of the 1929 Act would be avoided by abolishing the requirement that
an applicant for an inspection prove to the Board of Trade the absence of
malicious motives. 's Where previously applications were received on be-
half of one-tenth of the outstanding stock, a group of 200 stockholders would
now suffice. 29 More significantly, the Board of Trade is permitted to pro-
ceed on its own motion, if reasonable ground exists to suspect fraud in the
promotion of an enterprise, misfeasance in management, the withholding
of information from stockholders, oppression by majority stockholders, or
if it is in the public interest. 31
Failure to disclose information needed in an investigation would subject
persons responsible to contempt proceedings. 31 The Board of Trade would
now be able to distribute the report of an inspection to the stockholders, or,
if necessary, institute civil action in the name of the company against re-
sponsible officers. Persons successfully prosecuted would be liable for the
expense of the investigation. 32
Prosecutions. To complement the government's increased investigatory
powers the Director of Public Prosecutions would be given greater statutory
authority to proceed criminally whenever there is "reasonable cause to be-
lieve . . . an indictable offense has been committed" without regard to
chances of success or to possible expense. -1 Prosecution of offenses discov-
ered during liquidation, where reluctance to proceed has previously been
noticeable, is now stressed. 14 The Committee considers that a real threat
of criminal prosecution will prove a valuable deterrent.
28. REPORT § 155 and p. 101; cf. § 135 of the Companies Act.
29. The present requirements are particularly restrictive when a company is large.
Ibid.
30. The investigation would extend to any parent or subsidiary. It is hoped that pos-
ing the power to inspect would cause companies to meet stockholder grievances. Rr'orr
§ 156. Cf. SFcuarriEs Acr §8(e), 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §77a (1940) (herein-
after cited by section number only) ; Sacunrrins EXcHANGE Acr §§ 17, 21; 48 STAT. 831
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1940) (hereinafter cited by section numb2r only); Punuc
Urnrry HOLDING COMPANY AcT § 18. For state statutes see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LA, § 352
(power of attorney-general to investigate); II_ STAT. ANN. c. 121%, § 105 (Smith-Hurd,
Supp. 1946) (power to inspect, and technique of coordination with the Securities Act on
accountant's certification of data).
31. REPoRT p. 102.
32. Wide discretion would be given the court in assessing the costs of investigations
which would become a first charge on any amounts recovered. RvEPoaT §§ 157-8.
33. REPORT p. 106.
34. REPORT § 151. The Committee noted a five year period during which only three
public prosecutions were undertaken out of thirty-two reported cases. Ibid. Cf. § 277 of
the Companies Act.
The Report also suggests that since the usual indictment for fraud practiced by more
than one person is conspiracy, the present maximum penalty of two years be increased.
REPORT § 165.




In its supervision of stocks, the Companies Act of 1929 provides the Eng-
lish counterpart to the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts and our
state Blue Sky Laws. Its controls are supplemented by the London Stock
Exchange Council, which imposes, apart from statute, its own requirements
as a condition of dealing on England's largest exchange.
Prospectuses. As a means of presenting information to the investor, the
Companies Act has specifically emphasized the prospectus, which is broadly
defined as any document by which an offer for sale of shares is made to the
public. '6 Under existing law a company can proceed to an allotment of
shares immediately upon the publication of the prospectus. Since such a
practice allows insufficient time for press comment or expert advice, a com-
pulsory minimum of two days is proposed between publication of the pros-
pectus and the receipt of subscriptions. 11 The additional time would also
permit strengthened requirements on the disclosure of material contracts,
which now include only the dates and names of the parties and the avail-
ability of the contracts for inspection. The Report, finding that the inclusion
of a summary of material contracts would make prospectuses inordinately
bulky, compromises by suggesting that the general nature of the contracts
be described 11 and that the contracts be delivered to the registrar of com-
panies for public inspection. 19 The Committee goes outside its field to sug-
gest that, considering the value of publicity (as contrasted with disclosure
only), the law of libel might be relaxed to permit freer press comment. 41
Under the normal method of flotation, prospectuses contain a statement
that permission to deal on a stock exchange has or will be undertaken. If
permission is refused or deferred after subscriptions are taken and an allot-
ment made, the securities are rendered practically unmarketable. A partial
solution is advanced by making application for permission mandatory within
supra note 20; Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
21 VA. L. REv. 139 (1934). Cf. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 353.
36. ComPANiEs AcT § 380. The essentials are an offer by the company to the public.
A circular addressed to shareholders is not regarded as a prospectus, even if the invitation
to invest can be renounced in favor of others. Id. § 35(3). "Placings" which amount to
offers to the public would now be within the definition. REPORT § 22. Compare § 2(10) of
the Securities Act which provides that a communication is not deemed a prospectus if a
prospectus is sent to the individual concerned, or if a statement is made explaining from
whom a prospectus can be obtained, and does no more than identify the security, its price
and the persons by whom orders will be executed.
37. REPORT § 27 and p. 19. Cf. SECURITIES AcT § 8 (20 day period).
38. REPORT § 31 and p. 20. Compare Schedule IV, pt. 1, § 13 of the Companies Act,
as changed, zith the similar wording of Schedule A(24) of the Securities Act 48 STAT. 88
(1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1940) (hereinafter cited as Schedule A).
39. Though material contracts are now made available, at a reasonable time and
place, the lack of time for inspection had rendered the provision of little value to investors,
and the contracts have not been made readily available for future reference. REPORT § 31.
40. REPORT § 26.
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48 hours after the issue of a prospectus, 41 and by making a declaration that
permission had been granted, or at least not refused, a prerequisite to the
start of a new enterprise. 42 The cost of property to promoters as well as the
sale price to the company is to be disclosed by a short account in the pros-
pectus of all property transactions to which the funds receivcd from the
issue are to be applied provided any director, proposed dircetor, or promoter
was directly or indirectly interested. 13
The Report has given attention to auditors' reports and accounting in
prospectuses. It would now become a statutory obligation to include a report
of a company's assets and liabilities. "I Profits, now given for three years
preceding the issue, would be disclosed for five, 1 and auditors would be
under obligation to make any statement necessary for the accuracy of a
prospectus. Holding companies' profit and loss statements would be made
for the group as a unit. 4
Civil Liability for Prospectuses. Section 37 of the Companies Act, pro-
viding civil liability for false statements in prospectuses, is the forerunner
of Section 11(a) and (b) of the Securities Act of 1933. 47 Section 37, however,
does not at present expressly recognize that omissions of material informa-
tion are frequently as misleading as untrue statements. Nonetheless, Eng-
lish courts have been liberal in using the overall impression of a statement
as a criterion of falsity or deceptive truth, 4s an interpretation approved in
41. If permission to deal is refused within 21 days, allotments would be canceled and
subscriptions returned. REPoRT § 28 and p. 19.
42. The London Stock Exchange Council may defer action on an application until
after the issue of the first report where the proposition is of a speculative nature. ~roz-T
§28.
43. REPORT § 30 and p. 20. Cf. Schedule A (20). The remaining recommendations ap-
pear to have been anticipated by the Securities Act.
44. R asoR § 37 and pp. 21-2. For state statutes see K%:;. Gm:;. STAT. § 17-701 (Cor-
rick, 1935); MAss. STAT. A-.. c. 156, § 47 (1932); Micr. STAT. A:;. §§ 21.82-.91
(Supp. 1946).
45. REPORT § 32; cf. Schedule A(26) (3 years).
46. REPoRT § 21. By present requirements if any part of the proceeds of an issue is to
be applied to the purchase of a company thereby rendered a subsidiary, an accountant's re-
port must be included upon the profits of the company to be acquired. This regulation
would now include control acquired by stock purchase. REPor § 34 and pp. 21-2; cf.
Schedule A(27).
Corresponding changes to embody the Committee's recommendations would also be
made in §§ 354, 355, dealing with the prospectuses of corporations incorporated outside Great
Britain. REPORT pp. 22-3.
47. However, § 37 of the Companies Act contains no equivalent of § 11(e) of the Se-
curities Act. See Stevens v. Hoare, 20 T.L.R. 407 (Ch. D. 1904). Nor is there a statutory
definition of a standard of reasonableness as in § 11(c) of the Securities Act. See Adams
v. Thrift, [1915] 2 CI. 21. See generally Shulman, Citvl Liability and the Sccuritics Act,
43 YALE L. J. 227 (1933).
48. See Greenwood v. Leather Shod Wheel Co., [1900] 1 Ch. 421; Broome v. Speak,
[1903] 1 Ch. 586; Central Railway Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch, L. R. 2 H. L 99, 113
(1867). But see In re Christineville Rubber Estates, 81 L. J. C. 63 (1911).
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the Report. The latter would extend civil liability to statements in pros-
pectuses which are misleading by virtue of factual omissions that were known
or could have been known upon reasonable inquiry. 49
If misleading statements by experts are included in a prospectus, not only
would directors and promoters have the burden of justifying their reliance, 0
but the experts themselves, if their consent was obtained, must prove rea-
sonable ground for believing the truth of their statements. 61 Bankers and
solicitors, however, whose names may be listed prominently in the prospec-
tus, would not be subject to this liability. 52 The British provisions are
aided by judicial interpretation that reliance on the false statements neces-
sary in civil actions need not be induced by any specific statement in' the
prospectus. -1 The Securities Act in Section 11 similarly omits reliance in
the event the issuer has not, prior to purchase, made public an earnings
statement, but Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 16
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act do make reliance a part of the
plaintiff's cause of action. 14
Non-par Stock. In contrast to the American practice of allowing shares
of no par value, the Companies Act now requires that the charter must state
the amount of share capital of the company and that every provision in the
charter, by-laws, or in any resolution purporting to divide the enterprise
into shares shall be treated as a provision for share capital. 11 In failing to
recommend a departure from present law, the Committee gave considera-
tion both to the lack of public demand for non-par stock and to the elaborate
legislative and administrative supervision which might well reintroduce most
of the complications which non-par stocks are designed to avoid. 11
Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership. The problem of "nominee sharehold-
ings" was one of the most baffling to which the Committee directed its study.
49. REPORT 36 and p. 20. No mention is made of knowledge by the vendee of the
untruth or omission as a defense. See SEcuRITIES ACT § 11(a). With the recommenda-
tions of the Committee compare the parallel suggestions of SAMUEL, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 23-31.
50. Under § 11 (b) (3) (C) of the Securities Act the defendant must prove "lie had no
reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" the statements were misleading. Under
the English amendment, the defendant must prove that "he had reasonable cause to rely"
on the expertization. REPORT pp. 24-5.
51. REPORT p. 25. Cf. SEcunrIEs AcT § lI(b) (3) (B).
52. REPORT § 46.
53. Compare Arnison v. Smith, 41 Ch. D. 348, 369 (1889) with Macleay v. Talt,
[1906] A.C. 24. See Shulman, supra note 47, at 249.
54. See WASHINaTON, CORPORATE EXEcTIVEs' COMPENSATION 361 (1942). With the
shift of the burden of proof in criminal cases as well as civil, opportunity for restrictive
interpretations of these provisions would appear minimized. See infra pp. 1395-6. Cf.
Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.Cal. 1939).
55. COmPANES AcT §§ 2(4), 21.
56. REPORT §§ 17-8. See Berle, Problens of Non-Par Stock, 25 CoL L. RV. 43
(1925) ; WICKERSHAM, STOCK WITHOUT PAR VALUE (1927) ; 1 DEwigc, Tu FINA14-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 70-6 (4th ed. 1946).
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As reasons for requiring disclosure of beneficial stock ownership, proponents
stressed the desirability of exposing actual or potential foreign control over
essential British industries and the advantages to domestic stockholders
and creditors of locating the precise seat of corporate control. 6" On the
other hand, the nominee system is extremely popular and serves useful and
convenient functions for residents outside the United Kingdom and for exec-
utors and trustees under wills. - While endorsing the principle of complete
disclosure, " the Committee found suggested reforms to "involve a volume
of work out of all proportion to the probable benefits to the public." The
Committee therefore limited itself to compromise measures. Beneficial
ownership is defined in terms of (a) absolute ownership of a share, (b) power
to transfer a share absolutely or conditionally, or (c) power to control a
share's vote directly or indirectly. 1 Transferees of shares would be required
to state whether or not they are the beneficial owners thereof and beneficial
owners of 1% or more of any class of capital stock must disclose such in-
terest in books to be made available for inspection. 01 In terms of practi-
cal effect, however, the most important recommendation utilizes the
administrative machinery of the Board of Trade by giving it sweeping powers
to investigate transactions where it is desirable or in the public interest to
disclose beneficial ownership. 62
DIRECTORS
The increasing gulf between widely distributed ownership and control is
57. Public knowledge of who controls the press and the advantage in facilitating
shareholder communications were also emphasized. RIZERT § 79.
58. Approximately 600,000 individual holdings were registered in the names of banks
of the British Bankers' Association in 1943. One bank analyzed its holdings as follows:
18% for residents outside the United Kingdom; 8% for stock ex-change brokers; 45
for insurance and trust companies; 8% to facilitate purchases and sales and for con-
venience due to absence abroad; 50% for executors and trustees under vills; 115 as se-
curity; unidentified purposes included less than 15. More than the last group, of course,
could embrace concealment. Other figures indicate a turnover of almost four times per
year per share held. RF-PORT § 78.
59. REPORT § 80. "Our doubts are on the question of enforceability." Layers of
trusteeship may become multiple in many cases before real beneficial ownership is reached.
The Committee notes possible methods of evasion were a flat prohibition of registration
in the names of nominees adopted. Ibid.
60. REPORT p. 49. As to whether this definition includes "trustees" or "mortgagees"
see 200 L.T. 58 (1945) ; 89 SoL. J. 538-9 (1945).
61. REPORT §§ 81-2. Schedule A (6) of the Securities Act requires the identification,
when known, of all persons beneficially owning 10% of any class of stock or 10% in the
aggregate of outstanding stock. See also § 10(a) (1) (C) of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act (identification of persons owning or controlling 1% or more of any class of
securities).
62. The Committee characterizes these powers as "drastic." The Board of Trade
would have power to appoint an inspector to investigate ownership, and to direct the
company to deny the exercise of any rights, including dividends, attached to shares under
question. REPoRT §§ 84-5 and p. 45.
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an economic fact of corporate evolution. Directors, increasingly "managers
rather of other people's money than of their own," 63 assume a trustee as
well as an administrative function. " On this problem the Report makes a
number of recommendations, the cumulative effect of which not only would
impose higher levels of director responsibility but also make public many
of the financial relations between companies and their directors.
Responsibility. In the problem of loans, the Committee has squarely met
the dual motivations posed by a conflict between a director's self-interest
and his duty. While Section 128 of the present Companies Act controls the
borrowing of a director or officer from a company only to the extent of dis-
closing certain details in the accounts, the Report includes, as do many of
our state laws, 65 a flat prohibition of such loans. In a broader formula, how-
ever, than that of our state law counterparts, the prohibition would extend,
as in the Investment Company Act of 1940, to loans by subsidiaries to di-
rectors of parent companies or "under guarantee from or on security pro-
vided by" the corporation or controlled interests. 66
The Report proposes that a new section be added to the Companies Act,
dealing with transactions by directors in company stock, but is unable to
advance more than its standard solution of complete disclosure of any direct
or indirect interest in stock or debentures. - Three of our federal enactments
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission go considerably
further in permitting redress for abuse of inside information. For disclosure,
however, the Securities Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act
require ownership of 10% of stock of any class. 68
The Companies Act at present requires that a director reveal his interest
in material contracts either at a directors' meeting or by general notice to
63. ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, Bk. V, Ch. I, pt. 3, Art. 1 (1776).
64. ". . . when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a close comes
to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to
observe the fiduciary principle ... that 'a man cannot serve two masters.'" Stone,
Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1934).
65. See, for example, DEL REV. CODE § 2068 (1935); N.J. STAT, ANN. § 14:8-10;
Onio GEN. CODE § 8623-123a (Page, 1937) ; Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878, 151 P.2d
840 (1944). For other problems on loans to directors, see Rubinstein v. Kasprzak, 96
N.J.Eq. 406, 124 AtI. 362 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924) ; Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 238,
104 N.W. 119, 128 (1905); STATEMENT ON LIFE INSURANCE 57 (TNEC Monograph
28-A, 1941).
66. REPORT p. 51. Cf. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT §§ 17, 21. See Report of the Stock-
holders Investigating Committee of the Texas Corporation, discussed in Douglas, Direc-
tors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1309-10 (1934) (total loans to officers
and employees of $2y million).
67. The proposals appear wider than those for nominees. See p. 1393 supra, Books
recording directors' stock transactions and holdings would be available to shareholders
before the annual meeting and to the Board of Trade at any time. REPORT pp. 50-1.
68. SECURITIES EXCHANGE AT § 16(b), PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
§ 17(b), and INVESTMENT COMPANY AT § 30(f) permit suits by or on behalf of the issuer
to recover insider's profits on purchase and sale of the corporation's securities within six
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other directors. '9 The London Stock Exchange Council in addition places
limitations on the classes of contracts upon which a director, if personally
interested, may vote. 7 0 These sanctions are modified only by making the
notice of interest a part of the recorded minutes of the directors' meetings. 7 '
The Committee declined to write into legislation a proposed judicial solu-
tion that all transactions in which interested directors have participated are
voidable. 72 Such a general prohibition was considered impracticable both
because the permutations of directors' interest could not adequately be
anticipated by legislation and in some cases a quorum of disinterested direc-
tors would be rendered impossible. 
73
Criminal sanctions against directors have been strengthened in one im-
portant respect. At present, the prosecution must prove the falsity of a
statement in a prospectus and, in addition, the director's knowledge of the
falsity. 7 4 The Committee recommended that the burden of proof be shifted
to the director to show that he did not and could not, by reasonable precau-
tions, know of the misstatement. 75 Such a measure was discussed in hear-
ings on the Securities Act but rejected as "contrary to the principle of Ameri-
can jurisprudence that guilt is never to be presumed." 70 Although precedent
exists in this country as well as in England 7 for a statutory shift of the bur-
den of proof in criminal cases, American courts have been insistent upon
looking to the rational probabilities of the presumption as determinative
of its constitutionality. "I The Committee expressly states that, in their
months. The cited section of the Securities Exchange Act applies to "equity" securities,
while the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Investment Company Act are not
similarly limited.
69. ComPANms AcT § 149.
70. REPORT § 95.
71. REPoRT § 95 and p. 52.
72. British decisions have been particularly inclined to void transactions in which di-
rectors had personal interest. See cases collected in BALLA TNE, Co.rzox. S § 67
(1946). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943): "Abuse of corporate
positions, influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law
may deal with them effectively only by prohibitions unconcerned with the fairness of a
particular transaction."
73. Thus, the company may merely be considering a shipment of goods by a railroad
in which a director held some stock. A contract between a parent and subsidiary in which
the boards are identical provides an example of the lack of a quorum of disinterested di-
rectors. REPoRT § 95.
74. Prosecutions are normally brought under § 84 of the Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25
Vicr., c. 96. REPORT § 41.
75. REPORT § 41 and p. 25.
76. See Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Rcs. 84, S. Res.
56, and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6840, 7227 (1934).
77. For English precedent, see REPoRT § 41. For American precedent compare Casey
v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928) ; Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) ;
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. (1922), ith
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
78. See cases cited note 77 supra.
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opinion, a proven false or misleading statement is sufficiently exceptional to
warrant the presumption. 79 The British proposal, however, appears moti-
vated more by the important in terrorem influence of the law than by ad-
ministrative considerations such as the facilitation of proof.
One unchanged provision of the Companies Act deserves consideration
along with the many revisions of the Report. Non-managing directors, whose
position has been emphasized in British business custom, often bring to their
job interests sufficiently detached from the managing side of the board to pro-
vide in a real sense independent supervision and another facet of stockholder
representation. 80 However, the different functions of the two types of direc-
tors are accorded no appreciable recognition in United States law. Indeed,
non-managing directors may be at a disadvantage, since they are in no posi-
tion to satisfy the detailed standards which our federal enactments put on
them. England recognizes the distinction by imposing a different standard
of liability. Among the circumstances against which director's responsi-
bilities are to be judged the Companies Act includes "those connected with
his appointment." 81
Compensation. The compensation of directors, an issue of increasing im-
portance in the light of rising tax rates and the greater dependence on salaries,
is treated in three recommendations. Perhaps motivated more by disap-
proval of a group uniquely immune from increases in taxation than by the
necessity of effecting a practical solution to the difficulties "tax-free" remun-
eration provide, 82 the Committee has proposed an outright prohibition of
the practice whereby a company assumes the tax burden on directors' sal-
aries. 8 3 An additional reason advanced for removing "tax-free" salaries from
the ambit of stockholders is the difficulty that stockholders would have in
determining the cost of management, since the charges to the corporation
would vary with the director's total income. 84
79. R Por § 41.
80. See Douglas, supra note 66; 5 U. CHI. L. Rv. 668 (1938). But see SAmUEL, op,
cit. supra note 26, c. V.
81. COMPANIES AcT § 371 (1). See REPORT OF THF ENGLISH COMPANY LAW AMEND-
MENT CoMmITTEE § 47 (1926). The clause has drawn favorable American comment. See
Douglas, supra note 66, at 1328; 5 U. Cm. L. REv. 668, 672-4 (1938).
The controversial recommendation is also made that directors be removable by ordi-
nary resolution rather than the 75% of those voting now required in Table A of the
Companies Act. REPORT § 130 and p. 84.
82. For treatment of the tax problem, compare Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) with Michelham's Trustees v. Commissioners of Inland Reve-
nue, 144 L. T. R. 163 (C.A. 1930).
83. REPORT § 88 and p. 52. In one state of this country "tax-free" salaries are simi-
larly prohibited. Twenty-seven years after enactment, Section 385 of the New York Tax
Law, which voids all agreements "directly or indirectly to pay or assume to bear" taxes
payable under the law, has been interpreted to invalidate agreements to carry taxes on
executive salaries. Reiss v. Reiss, 186 Misc. 511, 59 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
84. However, some compeisation schemes may actually effect a saving to the corpora-
tion. See WASHINGTON, op. cit. supra note 54, at 129.
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Though the same moral outlook is evident in its approach to disclosure
of directors' remuneration, 85 the Report does not recommend full disclosure
of the individual compensation of company officials. The function of dis-
closure is conceived to be only that of accounting for "director overhead,"
the aggregate amount of which can be measured by the shareholder against
the value of director services as a whole. fl And since it is only directors who
are their own keepers, other executives would not be included under this
provision. s, For accounting purposes, remuneration would be carried as a
separate item on the profit and loss account, but pension schemes would not
be, since included as remuneration in the year to which they are charged. s
American legislation in this field was given impetus during the depression
by public reaction to stockholder suits and federal investigation which had
revealed disproportionately large executive salaries. 9 The Securities and
Exchange Commission now has requirements for disclosure of individual
and aggregate incomes that go considerably further than the British pro-
posals.
A third aspect of the remuneration problem is presented when directors
are specially compensated for loss of office. The case law of Great Britain
has until recently dealt leniently with retirement bonuses to directors, 01 a
practice which the Report proposes to permit only upon express approval at
85. The Companies Act now provides for disclosure of all "emoluments" to directors
but excepts managing directors-a proviso that occasionally has resulted in entire boards of
"managing directors." COmPANIEs Acr § 128(3). REoRT § 89.
86. REPOrT § 90 and p. 52, thus repealing § 148 of the Companies Act. No specific
change in the provision for managing directors is suggested.
The Committee also recommends that "emoluments" be defined to include all allow-
ances which are assessed as income to the director for tax purposes. RPOxRT § 90 and p.
52.
87. The Committee rejected a proposal that incomes of executives over a statcd
amount be disclosed. REPORT § 90; cf. American requirements infra note 90.
88. REPORT p. 62.
89. See, for example, Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933) ; Rogers Y. Guaranty Trust
Co., 288 U. S. 123 (1933). VAsHIxGion, op. cit. supra note 54, c. 14.
90. SEcusunms Acr, Schedule A(14) requires the identification of officers whose re-
muneration is $25,000 or over yearly. Form 10-K, pursuant to § 13 of the Securities --
change Act, requires the identification of persons in three highest aggregates of remunera-
tion. It also requires disclosure of the aggregate of remuneration of all directors, all
officers, and employees receiving over $20,000 a year. See SECURmS ExcnANG- Act,
§ 12(b) (1) (D),(E) and (F), SEC GENERAL RuLEs AND REGULA 'NS UNDMr THE SE-
cuRrrrIs EXcHANGE AcT or 1934, Schedule 14A, esp. items 5 and 9; PuJImc UTnM1Y
HOLDING COMPANY Acr § 5(b) (2) (D) and (E); INvEST MENT CoMPy, :. Ac? §8(b) (4).
See also ,VAsrxGcroN_, op. cit. supra note 54, at 226-36.
91. Compare Cyclists' Touring Club v. Hopkinson, [1910] 1 Ch. 179 uith Associated
Portland Cement Mfrs., Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1946] 1 All Eng. 68
(C.A.) American decisions on retirement bonuses have been less liberal. See cases col-
lected in Notes, 40 A.L.R. 1423, 1440 (1926) ; 88 A.L.R. 751, 755 (1934).
The Committee also recommends that a retiring age for directors be fixed at 70 to be
effective automatically unless stayed by special resolution. REPRT § 131.
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a general stockholder meeting with all circumstances revealed. 92 Com-
pensation for loss of office attendant upon a transfer of controlling interests
in stock, a recurring English problem, would be illegal unless ratified by
stockholders of the classes affected. " Money or stock acquired by directors
violating these provisions would be deemed to have been received in trust. 14
The Report does not comment on the important American problem of the
indemnification of directors against litigation expenses arising out of unjusti-
fied charges.
STOCKHOLDERS' CONTROL
The other phase of involute corporate control is ownership vested in dis-
persed, small, absentee shareholdings. While nominally at least, the greatest
safeguard against oppression lies in the right to vote, stockholders have yet
to be welded into an effective, articulate, and democratic body. The Com-
mittee directs its attention to practical provisions which can afford aggres-
sive minority stockholders means to express their ideas and to organize some
measure of support for them.
Proxies. The proxy system-lifeline of corporate control-poses simul-
taneously the greatest opportunities for democratic participation in corpo-
rate management and for wide-scale abuse. 95
As a first step in controlling proxies, it is recommended that the notices of
meetings be accompanied by a clear statement that non-stockholders as well
as stockholders may be appointed as proxies. 11 Company by-laws which
have restricted this privilege to stockholders confine materially the choice
of representatives. Indeed, such a restriction may leave the stockholder a
92. The exception recognizes situations in which it is to the corporation's interest to
negotiate a resignation rather than face legal proceedings after dismissal. REPoRT § 92(a)
and p. 52. Cf. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 974 (S.D.N.Y.
1942).
93. REPoar § 92(b) and p. 52. See Hulton v. West Cork Ry. [1883] 23 Ch. D. 654,
684.
When any offer is made to a company to purchase stock or assets, the proportion of
the offer that would be diverted under the name of compensation to directors would be ap.
proved by those receiving the balance of the offer. Any advantage received by a director
within one year before or two years after an offer was accepted would be deemed to be in
contemplation of the offer unless the director can show the advantage would have accrued
independently. REPORT § 92(b) and pp. 52-3.
94. Redistribution would be at the director's expense. REPoRT § 92(b) and p. 53.
95. The Committee's recommendations on proxies are also important because the
Companies Act of 1929 only referred to the problem in minor provisions of Table A. The
amendments are thus designed to override by-laws to the contrary.
96. REPORT § 132 and p. 85. See People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court of
San Francisco, 104 Cal. 649, 38 Pac. 452 (1894) (right to appoint non-stockholder as
proxy even if forbidden by by-laws). But see Colonial Assurance Co. v. Smith, 22 Mani-
toba L.R. 441 (1912). Other cases have not taken so explicit a stand. See also Gentry-
Futch Co. v. Gentry, 90 Fla. 595, 609, 106 So. 473, 478 (1925).
[Vol. 56 :13831398
BRITISH CORPORATE LAW REFORM
choice of renouncing his vote or ratifying the management proxies. 17 The
recommendation would make available as proxies independent professional
advisors and thus aid the absent stockholder by substituting expertise for
the average stockholder's unfamiliarity with the intricacies of corporate
affairs and by creating a professional group to scrutinize management poli-
cies.
There is no statutory obligation in either England or the United States
to mail proxy forms to stockholders. The Report, however, would require
the inclusion of a statement of the right to proxy with notice of meetings. c
Furthermore, proxy forms, if issued at company expense, must be distributed
to all stockholders. The proposed obligation is to be contrasted with a recent
English case in which only holders of 2500 or more pounds' worth of stock
received forms from the company, while smaller stockholders, left to shift
for themselves, had many home-made proxy forms disqualified by irregulari-
ties. Such preferential methods were held to be a question of policy for the
company that was legally unassailable unless prohibited by the charter. G The
principle of equality of rights for proxies would extend to their right to speak
and demand polls at meetings as well as vote. 11" And principals would be
able to direct their proxy to split their stock for voting on both sides of an
issue. 101
The Committee also discussed the suggestion urged upon them that proxy
forms be so worded that members, by a form of referendum, may vote for
or against resolutions separately. A similar practice is presently required
by the London Stock Exchange Council whenever special business is trans-
acted. 102 The conclusion of the Committee, however, is that neither this
suggestion nor one to give a proxy discretionary voting powers is a practi-
cable legislative matter. 103
The proxy requirements under Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act
are among the most important of our federal regulations. 104 The Securities
97. See People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 104 Cal.
649, 38 Pac. 452 (1894).
98. R~oRr § 132 and p. 85.
99. Wilson v. L.M.S. Ry. [1940] 1 Ch. 393; see also Peel v. L. and N.WV. Ry.
[1907] 1 Ch. 5. Cf. Hand v. lissouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 651 (D.C.
Del. 1944) (discussing the advantage of the management in having paid proxy solicitors
and declaring that it is not a function of the court to keep factions on equal financial
footing).
100. REPoRT p. 87. § 117(4) of the Companies Act is to be modified to provide that
any five stockholders, or any group aggregating one-tenth of the voting rights may de-
mand a poll on any resolution. See Second Consolidated Trust, Ltd. v. Ceylon Amal-
gamated Tea and Rubber, Ltd. (1943) 2 All Eng. 567.
101. REPoRT § 135 and p. 85.
102. REPoRT § 132.
103. Such matters are left to the discretion of the London Stock Exchange Council,
"which can waive or modify them in suitable cases." Ibid.
104. These proxy rules are incorporated by reference in the Public Utility Holding
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and Exchange Commission specifically requires that proxy solicitations per-
mit a choice between approval or disapproval of each matter to be acted
upon by the proxy, and it sanctions the conferring of blanket discretionary
authority for matters unanticipated by the solicitor. 105 The Commission
has significantly utilized proxy solicitations as a means of presenting informa-
tion to the stockholder and requires detailed disclosure of the interests be-
hind the solicitation, and of the particulars of the transactions to be acted
upon. 10 Proxy regulations, however, may now be avoided simply by not
soliciting proxies. To remedy this major defect, the Commission has recom-
mended that Section 14 be amended to require issuers to submit the informa-
tion required by the proxy rules before corporate meetings. 197
Equality of representation by proxy and knowledge of individual rights
lose their efficacy without means of communication between stockholders
to organize blocks of opinion. The Cohen Committee thus proposes that
100 stockholders holding on the average not less than £100 of paid-up stock,
or stockholders with 5% or more of the voting stock shall be entitled to send
out with the notice of the annual meeting a 1000 word statement of proposed
resolutions. Notice of the resolutions would be made to the company within
35 days of the meeting, and a right to require distribution by the company of
a 1000 word comment on matters to be transacted would be present from
the time of notice of the meeting until seven days thereafter. 103 Time allow-
ances for communications would be supplemented by restricting the period
in which proxy returns could be required in advance of the meetings to 48
hours. I09
Under the Securities Exchange Act management is obligated to include
with proxy solicitations proposals which stockholders give notice of intend-
ing to present fo" action at the meeting and, if such proposals are opposed
Company Act § 12(e) and Rule U-61; and in the Investment Company Act § 20 and
Rule N-20A-1. These sections make proxy solicitation unlawful through the use of
any interstate instrumentality or the mails unless in accordance with rules prescribed by
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
105. See Rule X-14A-2 under the Securities and Exchange Act.
106. Every proxy solicitation must include the information required in Schedule 14A,
and, if directors are to be elected, an annual report to security holders. Rule X-14A-1.
For discussions of the proxy regulations see Dean, Non-Compliance vith Proxy Regu-
lations, 24 CORN. L. Q. 483 (1939) ; Axe, Corporate Proxics, 41 MxCx. L. REv. 38, 225
(1942) ; Bernstein and Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies, 7 U. C1i1.
L. REv. 226 (1940); Comment, 33 ILL L. REV. 914 (1939); Notes, 53 HAV. L. REv.
1165 (1940), 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 297 (1939).
107. REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FIOR
AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT or
1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941). PROPOSAL TO SAFEGUARD INVESTORS, H. R. Doc. No.
672, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 17-20, 31 (1946) recommends extending proxy regulations to secu-
rities of unregistered companies of at least $3,000,000 in assets and 300 security holders.
108. REPORT § 128 and p. 85-6. The seven day limitation is imposed to allow directors
to circulate answers to any criticism.
109. REPORT § 134 and p. 84.
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by the management, to distribute a statement of 100 words at the stock-
holder's request. 110 Under the Commission's rules, the management must
anticipate which proposals are "proper subjects for action by the security
holders" or render the solicitation "false and misleading in a material
respect," " while the British amendment places the responsibility for
the substance of communications upon the stockholder. As a second point
of difference it will be noted that all cost of distribution of communications
under the British scheme would be borne by the company except for print-
ing, and even that on occasion subject to reimbursement by the com-
pany, 112 whereas the Securities and Exchange Commission permits inde-
pendent solicitation but places the not inconsiderable cost of such communi-
cations on the stockholder. "I As sanctions the Report would use discretion-
ary fines on each responsible person, one of the few techniques not included
in the arsenal of SEC regulations. 114
Meetings. To the extent that disclosure requirements are intended to pro-
vide information essential to an appraisal of management operation and pol-
icy, it is largely to corporate meetings that they are ultimately directed. If
the meetings are postponed, held in inaccessible places, or if stockholders
are ignored by a withholding of notice, their right of participation has been
correspondingly abrogated. 115
110. Rule X-14A-7. Notice 30 days in advance of a date corresponding to the proxy
solicitations of the previous year is prima fade reasonable notice of a proposal. Ibid.
See also Rule X-14A-6; TRusT INDEVTURE Acr § 312, 53 STAT. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aa (1940).
111. Rules X-14A-5 and 7. For complications under the SEC rules, see Dean, supra
note 106, at 497-517. Rule X-14A-7, however, relates only to matters which are ap-
propriate subjects for stockholder action under state law, and not in obtaining e..pres-
sions of a stockholder's political, social or economic views. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 3638, Jan. 3, 1945.
112. If a general meeting of the company so resolves, the printing costs would be
refunded. REPoRr § 128 and p. 86.
113. Rule X-14A-6. Cf. Wilson v. L.M., and S. Ry. [1940] Ch. 393, 395 (difference
in cost between partial and total solicitation that of M250 and £4000).
114. Fines range from 150 (failure to notify of right to pro:y) to ilID (preferential
distribution of proxy forms) and £500 (breach of communication provisions) for each
responsible officer or director knowingly a party to the default. RErorr pp. 85-6.
For the variety of remedies available to the Securities and Exchange Commission, see
SEC v. Okn, 139 F.2d 87 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) (injunction to restrain vinlatin of rules);
Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (election of direc-
tors set aside) ; SEC v. Okn, 58 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.N.Y 1944) (injunction to restrain
use at annual meeting of proxies obtained in violation of rules) ; SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d
784 (C.C.A. 2d 1943) (power to regulate proxies extends to writings part of a con-
tinuous plan ending in solicitation; inclusion of a statement necessary to prevent asser-
tion being false or misleading).
115. REPoRT § 127; See Walsh v. State, 199 Ala. 123, 126, 74 So. 45, 47 (1917) ; Mottu
v. Primrose, 23 Md. 482 (1865) ; cf. Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 149-50, 16 NAV.
854, 859 (1883).
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The Companies Act provides for 7 days' advance notice of annual general
meetings. 116 As the Committee finds this period insufficient for the desired
full exchange of individual viewpoints, it would extend the period to 21 days
for the general meeting and 14 days for other meetings. In emergencies,
however, the 14 day period could be waived by 95% of the voting stock and
the 21 day period by unanimous consent. 117
Touched only indirectly by federal enactments, 118 notice of meetings has
received far from uniform treatment in state legislation. In states where
notice was not required by statute, it has been held, perhaps unrealistically,
that the stockholder will be presumed to know the time and place of meet-
ings specified in the by-laws, and hence is not entitled to actual notice. 19
Where notice is required by statute but no period specified, the notice must
be reasonable, "0 but a period of as little as five days has been held suffi-
cient. 121 If the purpose of statutes requiring notice is to insure the oppor-
tunity of the stockholder to attend or to communicate his ideas, the English
period, or the 10 days required by the Model Business Corporation Act would
appear the minimum practical. 122
CONCLUSION
Public reaction to the Report has reflected a high degree of approval for
its technical competence. The timeliness of a major post-war revision is em-
phasized by the nationalization of many industries, and a consequent reloca-
116. COMPANIES Acr § 115(1); REPORT § 126.
117. REPORT § 126 and p. 86. The Committee also would clarify a minor point of
case law by providing that one shareholder can under proper circumstances constitute a
"meeting." See Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N.W. 547 (1893).
Contra: Sharp v. Dawyes, [1876] L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 26.
118. See, for example, Rule X-14A-1 (b), furnishing some advance notice of meet-
ings through the requirements for annual statements,
119. Warner v. Mowrer, 11 Vt. 385 (1839).
120. See In the Matter of Long Island R.R., 19 Wend. 37 (N.Y. 1837); Taylor v.
Grisword, 14 N.J.L. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1834).
121. Moon v. Moon Motor Car Co., 17 Del. Ch. 176, 151 Atl. 298 (Ch. 1930).
122. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 27. The period of notice prevailing in this
country is considerably below the 21 days advanced by the Committee. Some states per-
mit a 10 to 40 or 45 day period. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.27 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1946);
Nav YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAW §45; OHIO GEN. ConE § 8623-44 (Page, 1937).
Many, however, require less than 10 days; MASS. LAws ANN. c. 156, § 28 (1932) (7
days) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-502 (Purdon, 1930) (5 days). Delaware apparently
does not require notice except when the provisions in the by-laws concerning meetings
are changed. DEL. REV. CODE § 2062 (1935). AjICH. STAT. ANN., c. 195, § 21.39 permits
notice to be as provided in the by-laws.
It would appear that short periods of notice under state statutes or by-laws would
materially decrease the opportunity for communications between stockholders made pos-
sible, for example, by Rule X-14A-6, under the Securities Exchange Act. It is possible,
however, that an exploitation of the short periods of notice to avoid the proxy rules on
communications could be enjoined. See note 114 .ntpra.
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tion of investment of which a substantial amount will probably be from fixed
securities to stocks.
The Report, by excluding discussion of two issues, has lessened its reference
value. Company law has been defined largely by legislation without ade-
quate discussion of continuing administrative control by an independent
administrative agency similar to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. 112 And a substantial accounting revision has been undertaken without
a clarification of the basic legal issues involved in dividend law and the eval-
uation of assets. Criticism of the amendments, as presented to Parliament, 1 -4
has also been directed to the Committee's reluctance to abandon traditional
methods for more spectacular solutions to corporate problems. 2
While this innate moderation of approach may, in the testing ground of
British corporate practice, prove either a strength or a weakness, the Report's
delicate balancing of objectives, thoroughness, and attention to detail irrple-
ment its value as a legislative program and as a reference for many years in
the reconsideration of American laws.
123. See REPORT § 176; 89 SoL J. 473 (1945). Administrative control by the Board
of Trade has been increasingly stressed as the Bill progresses through Parliament. See
148 H.L.DEB. 958 (No. 54 1947) ; 438 H.C.DEB. 598, 611, 638 (5th Ser. 1947).
124. The new Companies Bill passed the House of Commons as this article went to
press. See 441 H.C.DEB. 172 (5th 1947). Surprisingly, the recommendation on the
ultra vires doctrine was omitted from the bill. See 202 L.T. 319 (1946).
For modifications made in the House of Lords, who first considered the Bill, see 148
I-LL.Dan. 955 (No. 54 1947).
125. See 149 THE EcoNOMUST 88, 126, 234, 372 (1945); 81 TnE BA-;rm- 21, 26
(1947), 89 SoL. J. 538-9. 526-7; 538-9, 548 (1945). Cf. Kahn-Freund, supra note 11;
148 THE ECONOMIST 185, 186 (1945).
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